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MANAGEMENT'S LEGAL PROBLEMS IN CONTINUING PLANT
OPERATIONS DURING AN ECONOMIC STRIKE UNDER
FEDERAL AND PENNSYLVANIA LAW*
BY NICHOLAS UNKOVICt and JAMES Q. HARTY*
Management has the right to attempt to continue the operation of its
business when subjected to an economic strike.' While the Mackay2 court
did not develop the origin of this right, it clearly flows from the "right of
property" guaranteed under both federal and state4 constitutions. This is
a well settled and basic rule of law. It is equally well recognized that this
"right of property" is subject to federal control where the flow of interstate
commerce is concerned 5 and likewise subject to state control under state
police powers where public health or safety is involved. 6
It is also well established in the law that subject to the same broad
confinements of the commerce clause and the police powers of the state, an
employer's workers have the right to form a labor organization, to bargain
and to engage in a peaceful primary strike. 7 Bypassing the argument whether
the strike or the threat of striking is the more valuable collective bargaining
weapon, it readily appears that the legal right to strike necessarily conflicts
with the legal right of the employer to continue his operations.
The purpose of this Article is to review the several legal problems faced
by an employer when he attempts to continue his operations. It does not
attempt to define or explore the criteria upon which a decision to attempt
continued operation will or should be prervised. For purposes of this article
* The "labor law" considered is exclusively federal; the Pennsylvania law treats
of other matters developed herein.
t A.B., 1928, Harvard University; LL.B., 1932, Dickinson School of Law; member,
Pennsylvania Bar; partner in the firm of Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay, Pittsburgh.
$ A.B., 1949, LaSalle College; M.B.A., 1952, LL.B., 1959, University of Pennsylvania; member, Pennsylvania Bar; associated with the firm of Reed, Smith, Shaw &
McClay, Pittsburgh. The research assistance of Messrs. Norman William Smith, Jr.,
and Scott F. Zimmerman is gratefully acknowledged.
1. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
2. Ibid.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
5. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
6. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. Camino, 25 West. 54, 47 Pa. D. & C.2d
1 (C.P. 1943).
7. Carpenters Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942); NLRB v. Fansteel
Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
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it is assumed that the strike involved relates to an appropriate collective
bargaining unit certified by the National Labor Relations Board8 and covers
all production personnel. It is further assumed that the strike is an "economic"
one associated with the negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement and
that the appropriate termination provisions of the previous collective bargaining agreement and the statutory requirements of the Labor Management
Relations Act 9 have been fully complied with. It is further assumed that prior
to the strike the parties at all times and whenever requested have engaged
in true collective bargaining so that the strike at its inception is clearly an
"economic" one and not an "unfair labor practice" strike. 10
The fundamental purpose of the economic strike and its associated
picket line is the imposition of economic hardship upon the employer for
the purpose of achieving the union's desired collective bargaining goals. The
economic hardship or duress is achieved by the stoppage of production. To
the extent that production is not stopped and sales income not stemmed, the
value of the strike diminishes. Because this continued production and sales
income may be achieved by the exercise of the right to operate during a
strike, no employer should voluntarily waive this prerogative. This is so,
even though an employer actually has reached a decision not to operate. To
compromise this right to operate is to relinquish a most important power
of management.
When management refuses to "lie down and play dead" (i.e., to shut
down production facilities) it is automatically accused of "strikebreaking"
and "union busting." The two terms are not synonymous and deserve to be
distinguished. While it is undoubtedly true that in continuing to operate
during a strike management hopes to strip the strike of its effectiveness, it
does not necessarily follow from this that management desires to "bust" the
union which has called the strike. Usually a decision by management to
continue plant operations during an economic strike is motivated either by
a total loss of confidence in the opposing union leadership with a consequent
conviction that the issues in dispute cannot be resolved at the collective
bargaining table, or the decision to continue operations is imposed by competitive conditions in the industry. In the case where the employer has relatively few customers who can easily be persuaded to switch to alternate
sources of supply, the company may feel that its economic survival requires
8. Labor Management Relations Act §§ 9(b)-(c), 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.c.
§§ 159(b)-(c) (1956).
9. LMRA § 8(d), 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1956).
10. Partial strikes and strikes which constitute a breach of contract present quite
different problems and legal remedies. For example, the employee's right to reinstatement
and the employer's right personally to solicit a return to work are quite different. These
types of strikes are therefore not considered in this paper.
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it to continue operations." To just this extent an employer under these
circumstances will exert his strongest efforts to avoid the calling of the
strike in the first instance.
Attempts at continued operations characteristically engender extreme
reaction from the striking union and its membership. This is necessarily so
because the company's decision to operate forcibly challenges the leadership
of the union and directly places the jobs of the individual members in
jeopardy.
MANNING.THE

STRUCK PLANT

Generally speaking, the continuation of production during an economic
strike will be accomplished by a utilization of one or a combination of several
of these sources of manpower:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Managerial and supervisory personnel.
Clerical and other non-union personnel.
New hires (replacements, temporary or permanent).
Returning or non-participating bargaining unit members.

Unless the employer involved is fortunate enough to have a production process
which is highly automated or mechanized, anything approaching normal
productivity cannot be obtained or maintained for a significant period of
time by the use of only supervisory personnel. Moreover, the attempt to
operate solely with non-production personnel is usually construed as a tacit
admission by the employer that he does not plan to replace the striking
employees. To this extent such operation may be self-defeating.
Operation of the plant by the use of clerical or other non-union personnel
faces the dual problem of whether such personnel can properly be spared
from their own work for any long period of time and whether they as a
class possess the requisite physical stamina, skill and ability.' 2 This latter
question is particularly relevant where the office labor force is predominantly
female and plant personnel predominantly male.
The use of either supervisory personnel or clerical personnel or a
combination of both will inflict economic duress upon the striking employees
and will serve to generate some dissatisfaction on their part, since they will
11. For example, in the recent case of Swarco, Inc. v. NLRB, 303 F.2d 668, 669
(6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 46 L.C. 17889 (1962), the court noted that "the petitioner
. . . was the exclusive producer of special hose products . . . and it being in the height
of the season, the employer was concerned over the possibility of losing these accounts
[and] decided to open the . . . plant immediately."

12. In the recent case of IUE v. NLRB, 303 F.2d 359, 360 (3d Cir. 1962), cert.
granted sub nor. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3108 (U.S. Oct. 9,
1962) (No. 288), the court noted that "the company attempted to maintain production
operations . . . by using clerical employees and other personnel outside the bargaining
unit. Production declined to a level between 15% and 20% of normal . .. ."
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necessarily be without wages during such times. If the initial strike was
either a "bluff" or was executed in the hopes of a "short term" strike, the
operation by supervisory or clerical people may achieve the total result
desired by management. However, if the union is geared for a "knock down,
drag out" strike, such tactics by the company ordinarily will not achieve
strike termination.
Assuming that management has elected or been forced to engage in an
"all out" test of strength, it is faced with the problem of securing hourly paid
workers to supplement its supervisory forces. Initially, management must
decide whether any portion or all of its striking employees will return to
work. Since this group includes persons in whom the company has a large
training and skill investment, it is very desirable from the company's point
of view that these people return. There are, on the other hand, those occasions
where, because of a prior history of poor labor-management relations, the
employer will be perfectly willing to forego its investment in training and skill
and to start with a "clean slate," i.e., with all new (replacement) employees.
The evaluation of whether or not a portion of the striking employees
will return will involve a variety of factors including the past relationship
between the employees and the company; the strength of the labor organization involved; the local employment situation, and the employee's own
appraisal of the merit of the union's demands insofar as he has any knowledge of the union's position. It is in this regard that a few weeks of
operation by supervisory personnel may yield benefits because it will have
"softened up" the employees' willingness to continue the strike.
If the decision is to attempt to staff with striking employees, the
problem of communicating this desire comes into focus. The possibility of
an employer unfair labor practice looms large at this time. If the communication effort is not properly executed, the strike may be converted
into an unfair labor practice strike and any subsequent attempt permanently to replace striking employees will be in vain.18
The communication utilized must not restrain or coerce the striking
employees into returning to work' 4 and the motivation for communicating
13. The Labor Management Relations Act § 10(c), 61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(c) (1958), provides, inter alia:
If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the
opinion that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging
in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of
fact and shall issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring
such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take
such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without
back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this Act ....
See Cusano v. NLRB, 190 F.2d 898 (3d Cir. 1951).
14. LMRA § 8(a) (1) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to intelfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
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with the employees must be innocent of any desire or intent to discourage
membership in the union. 15 The usual device employed is a form letter
mailed to the home address of each employee. In this letter the mutual rights
of the parties are explained and the economic necessity for the company's
continued operations is asserted. Usually a deadline for resumption of
production is declared, and it is then stated that failure to report on or
before such date will be taken as an indication that the employee does not
wish to report for work and that the company is free to secure a replacement.
Circuit courts have defended the fundamental legality of such a communication both under the constitutional guarantee of free speech' 6 and
under the protection of section 8(c) of the LMRA.17 Historically, the
circuit courts have been more protective of management rights in this area
than has been the NLRB.' 8 Also, the courts have insisted that such a letter
does not stand alone but must be evaluated on the basis of the totality of the
employer's conduct during the strike.' 9
The letter is sometimes accompanied by a return postcard which
employees are asked to execute and which permits them to indicate whether
they plan to return or not return. Often the letter is sent in conjunction with
radio, television or newspaper publicity setting forth the company's position.
When such letters are found to be violative of the LMRA the reasoning
usually is that they constitute in reality a threat of discharge. Often provoca20
tive words such as "terminated" are mentioned by the Board.
Technically, there cannot be any effective discharge until a permanent
replacement has been procured. There is no duty to communicate the securing
section 7." 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1956). LMRA § 7 states:

"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all

of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized
in section 8(a) (3)." 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1956).
15. A violation of LMRA § 8(a) (3), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3)
(1956), will otherwise lie.
16. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 236 F.2d 898 (6th Cir. 1956),
aff'd in part, rev'd and remanded in part, 356 U.S. 342 (1958) ; NLRB v. Bradley Washfountain Co., 192 F.2d 144 (7th Cir. 1951).
17. Section 8(c) provides: "(c) The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion,
or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall
not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions
of this Act, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of
benefit." 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1956).
18. See, e.g., Rubin Bros. Footwear v. NLRB, 203 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1953).
19. NLRB v. Associated Wholesale Grocery, 262 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1959).
20. See, e.g., NLRB v. Beaver Meadow Creamery, 215 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1954).
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of the replacement 21 and the question of whether or not an employee has
been discharged because of replacement is one of fact. Up until such replacement, the striking employee has a right to re-employment upon making an
22
unconditional offer to return.
A subsidiary question concerns the wages and benefits which may be
offered to the striking employee upon his offer to return. 23 A prudent offer
is one which offers re-employment under essentially the same terms and
conditions as were available at the date of the commencement of the strike.
To offer anything above and beyond this is to raise the possibility of a
section 8(a) (3) unfair labor practice charge. 24 However, the wage offered
may be raised as high as the last collective bargaining offer to the union
providing that there is no illegal motive in so doing and providing that an
impasse had been reached on this matter. 25 The union should of course be
notified of any such offer.
It must be recognized that in offering the same wages and conditions
as were available prior to the strike, the company will emphasize that these
conditions are being offered voluntarily and unilaterally and do not represent
any extension or renewal of the expired collective bargaining agreement.
The right of the striking employee individually to abandon the strike
and to return to work is fully protected in the law and any attempt by the
union to restrain or coerce this decision is itself an unfair labor practice by
the union. 26 This "right to work" applies just as much to the employee who
elects not to "walk out" in the first instance. 27 In addition to the unfair
labor practice aspect, Pennsylvania has particular statutory language pro28
tecting the right of an employee to continue working.
Any significant response to the invitation of the company by the
striking workers will necessarily influence the strike's continuation and any
major breach in union solidity frequently tolls the end of the strike effort
or at least markedly improves the possibility of a reasonable negotiated
settlement. Conversely, of course, if the "invitation" fails to secure any
21. Kansas Milling Co. v. NLRB, 185 F.2d 413 (10th Cir. 1950).
22. NLRB v. H. Rohtstein & Co., 266 F.2d 407 (lst Cir. 1959).
23. The most controversial of fringe benefits to be offered relates to seniority and
we have delayed discussion of this point until later in the Article when we discuss offers
to replacement employees. See p. 72 infra.
24. LMRA § 8(a) (3), supra note 15.
25. NLRB v. Bradley Washfountain Co., supra note 16; NLRB v. Penokee Veneer
Co., 168 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1948). Any higher offer would be an unfair labor practice.
Cf. NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 337 U.S. 217 (1949).
26. An LMRA § 8(b)(1)(A) violation. 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(1)(A) (1956).
27. NLRB v. Bell Aircraft Corp., 206 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1953).
28. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 200 (1952).
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significant response, the bargaining position of the union can be expected
to become more inflexible.
There are no statistics available to show the extent to which local law
enforcement or lack thereof contributes to the success or failure of "return"
invitations. When the picketing associated with the strike is permitted to
resemble an armed camp and where blockage of access to the plant is
tolerated, permitted or often sanctioned by local law enforcement officials
despite its long-recognized illegality,2 9 the striking employee will be more
easily discouraged from attempting to return to work and the company will
be less likely to provide the opportunity for such return since the probability
of success will be so severely reduced.
Utilization of individual or personal requests by foremen presents
several problems. Even assuming that the supervisors have been told the
legal limits of such personal contact, they may be carried away in the heat
of argument. Also, any conversations with unionminded employees are
subject to distortion and perversion when repeated to an investigating agent
from the NLRB. Such personal solicitation is sometimes very effective,
however, and so long as no benefit is promised or threat made or implied it
is protected under the free speech doctrine of the act. 80 This protection would
normally not extend to management attempts to generate back-to-work
movements.
Ultimately, the employer may arrive at the point where he must secure
replacements for his labor force from sources other than the striking employees. While we have previously discussed the legality of offers of work
to striking employees, it should not be assumed that such overtures must
precede the offering of jobs to the general public. Indeed there may be some
81
risk in such a separate effort.
The usual sources of recruitment, including existing files of applications
for employment, private employment agencies, radio, television or newspaper
advertising may be employed. A major exception to sources of applicants is
the United States Employment Service. The United States Secretary of
Labor has issued regulations which in turn have been adopted by some state
agencies whereby the employment service is prohibited from referring
personnel to any employer involved in a labor dispute. 32 Recently,. the
California Supreme Court has affirmed the legality of such regulations.83
29. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Local 601, 353 Pa. 446, 46 A.2d 16 (1946).
30. Section 8(c) of the LMRA is set forth at note 17 supra.
31. ' See discussion in Swarco, Inc. v. NLRB, supra note 11.
32. 20 C.F.R. §§ 602.2(b), 604.1(1) (1960).
33. Di Georgio Fruit Corp. v. Department of Employment, 56 Cal. 2d 54, 362 P.2d
487 (1961).
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3 4
Pennsylvania law adopts a position of non-referral in a labor dispute.
Moreover, Pennsylvania law limits stich recruiting by making it a misdemeanor for any person to recruit replacement employees unless the person
doing the recruiting is directly involved in the dispute or is a licensed employment agent. 5
The so-called "anti-strikebreaking" laws, both federal and state, have
no direct bearing here since the replacement employees are not strikebreakers
within the meaning of these acts. The conduct associated with the federal act
relates to employment for the purpose of obstructing or interfering with
strikers by force or threat.8 6 The Pennsylvania act merely limits the recruiting of replacements to licensed employment agents.37 A special Pennsylvania statute proclaims the right of an individual to engage in employment
in the face of labor strife.88
There is the additional problem of whether replacement employees
should be hired on a temporary or permanent basis. This problem is usually
not faced squarely since it would be self-defeating to advertise for temporary
replacements.8 9 What usually happens is that the company decides in good
faith that it will permanently employ the replacements, assuming they prove
to be satisfactory employees, and promises are made accordingly. If the
strike is not terminated by an unconditional surrender by the union, then
the parties negotiate some arrangement concerning strikers and their replacements. The latest device is to provide for impartial arbitration of the
relative rights of the two groups. 40 Sometimes the replacement program will
proceed slowly and yet achieve its impact rapidly enough to permit retention
of both the few new employees hired as well as the old employees. However,
generally speaking, the two groups have some difficulty in adjusting to one
another at the work station.
The question arises as to what may be offered to the replacement employee in terms of wages. The businesslike move appears to be the offering
of the pre-strike wage to the replacement; if this wage does not produce any
job replacements it is clearly permissible to raise the offer at least as high
as the last offer made in collective bargaining. 41 In the Times Publishing
Company case 42 the Board said:

§ 607 (1952).
§ 206 (1952).
36. 62 Stat. 760 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 1231 (1956).
37. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 206 (1952).
38. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 200-01 (1952).
34.
35.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,

39. There can be no effective economic replacement by use of temporary employees.
40. See, e.g., Bixby v. Wilson & Co., 196 F. Supp. 889 (N.D. Iowa 1961); Albers
v. Wilson & Co., 184 F. Supp. 812 (C.D. Minn. 1960).
41. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co. v. NLRB, 186 F.2d 106 (6th Cir. 1950); Kohler
Co., 128 N.L.R.B. 1062 (1960); Times Publishing Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 676 (1947).
42. Ibid.
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We cannot agree with the Trial Examiner that the respondents'
promulgation of unilateral Conditions of Employment, under the
facts of this case, constituted a violation of the Act. The respondents were clearly entitled to replace the economic strikers. While
the respondents were under a continuing obligation to bargain collectively with the Union upon request as to the issues between them,
we do not construe this obligation as requiring the respondents to
negotiate with the Union the conditions under which printers were
to be hired to replace the strikers; so to4 3hold would be to nullify
the respondents' right to hire replacements.
The wages offered were identical to the last company offer to the union.
Whether or not a higher wage could be offered has apparently not been
decided. If no replacements could be obtained at a lesser rate, there would
be the argument of economic necessity to support the higher offer. If wages
are still in dispute, the question arises as to why a higher offer was not made
to the union as a possible ground for settlement. In Pacific Gamble Robinson
Co. v. NLRB 44 the court stated that "there is no requirement of law that
the employer who rightfully hires replacements to continue his business
after a strike should offer the replacements the same rate which has been
offered the union. ' 45 The court, however, apparently felt impelled later to
state that:
The finding that the offer of 98 cents made to replacements after the
strike was higher than that made to the union on August 15, and
repeated on September 8, ignores the fact that the flat 98 cent rate
which was all that was offered the replacements included no right of
seniority or vacation with pay, no provision as to the length of the
work week, as to overtime, arbitration, and none of the other valuable features of the contract. On the conceded facts the offer made
to the union was much more advantageous than that made to the
46
replacement.
All offers made must be properly motivated and cannot be for the purpose
47
of bypassing the union.
A dilemma may develop if union members who have already returned
to work at their previous rate now request the same wage (highest offer)
being paid to replacements. It would appear that failure to meet this
demand might itself constitute a section 8(a) (3) violation because in effect
the employer would be discriminating on the basis of union member43. Id. at 684. (Footnotes omitted.)
44. Supra note 41.
45. Id. at 109.
46. Id. at 110.
47. If the motive is to induce return of strikers there is a violation of LMRA
§ 8(a) (3), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1956).
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ship. On the other hand, any wage increase given to existing employees is
presumptively viewed as an improper reward for not striking or for returning to work, and the employer bears the burden of proving proper
48
motivation.
Fringe benefits should also begin at the previous contract level and
move upwards only upon economic justification. The major fringe benefit
recently raised by the replacement of workers and examined in cases before
the Sixth and Third Circuits concerns the offering of "superseniority."
Superseniority as used here relates to any plan of job protection offered to
persons returning to or beginning work during an economic strike. In the
Third Circuit case of IUE v. NLRB 49 the protection was extended to both
strikers and replacement employees, and the court refused enforcement of a
labor board order which branded such a benefit as illegal per se. The Sixth
Circuit in Swarco, Inc.5° sustained the position of the NLRB where the
facts indicated that the job protection had been offered exclusively to striking
'employees.
There is no legal bar in economic strikes to the employer's offering
permanent jobs to strike replacements, and it is clear law that the striking
-employee, once he has been permanently replaced, has no claim to a job with
his former employer. 5 ' On the other hand, a striker is entitled to equal
consideration for future job opportunities in the company, but no preferential
52
treatment need be granted.
The success of any replacement campaign is again dependent upon a
variety of factors including the general reputation of the employer in his
-community, the general availability of work in the community, the availability
of the job skills required and the rates of pay offered, the history of labor
in the particular community, and the cooperation of law enforcement
officials in maintaining ready access to the plant.
NON-MANNING PROBLEMS

Four major difficulties other than manning problems suggest themselves
where continued plant operations are attempted. The first problem is one of
providing for the inflow and outgo of raw materials and finished goods.
Here existing federal 'law has rallied to the support of the employer.
Under the federal laws governing common carriers by rail, the existence
of a strike is no excuse for a refusal to a shipper of the service demanded by
48. NLRB v. James Thompson & Co., 208 F.2d 743 (2d Cir. 1953); Crookston
Times Publishing Co., 125 N.L.R.B. 304 (1959).
49. Supra note 12.

50.
51.
52

Swarco, Inc. v. NLRB, supra note 11.
NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
Economy Stores, Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 1 (1958).

1962]

MANAGEMENT'S LEGAL PROBLEMS

section 1(4) of the Interstate Commerce Act.5 3 Sympathy strikes by railroad employees are not permissible. The carrier must, in other words, provide
service across any picket line, physical or symbolic, if it can be done without
actual danger of physical injury to its property or employees. If the carrier
fails in this respect, it is subject to legal liability to pay the shipper's full
damages, plus a reasonable attorney's fee, under section 8 of the Interstate
Commerce Act. 54 In the decision of such a case, the trier of fact must
determine objectively, from all the circumstances, the soundness and candor
of any effort to excuse a lack of service on the ground that physical danger
5
made its refusal reasonable.
In practice, it is usually possible to avoid or terminate any situation
which justifies the defense of physical danger. The existence or at least the
continuance of such a situation is subject to control by injunction in the
courts of Pennsylvania and most other states. Any interference with the
operation of railroad trains in furtherance of the objects of a strike is, in
Pennsylvania, a crime. 50
Similar provisions to assure the continuance of interstate common
carrier motor truck service during strikes is made by other sections of the
Interstate Commerce Act. Under section 219 of the act, 57 the motor carrier
is bound to supply service, if it can be done without serious danger to persons
or property, to the same extent as in a railroad. The carrier who fails in this
regard is subject to liability for damages, under the same section of the act.5
As in the case of rail operations, the preservation of the peace, and the
legal prevention of physically dangerous activity by pickets or others, are
generally assured by the availability of the injunctive remedy.
The prevalence of "hot cargo" clauses in contracts between truck operators and the Teamsters Union, under which truck drivers can and sometimes do refuse to cross picket lines established by other unions, is not a
matter of any legal importance here, since it does not excuse the carrier from
his legal duty to provide service.5 9
Before completing this section, it is desirable to mention in passing
53. 54 Stat. 900 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 1(4) (1958) ; see also Burlington Truck
Lines, Inc. v. ICC, 194 F. Supp. 31 (S.D. Il1. 1961), where issuance of a new certificate
was upheld when existing carriers could not or would not serve.
54. 24 Stat. 382 (1887), 49 U.S.C. § 8 (1958).
55. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 215 F.2d 126 (8th
Cir. 1954).
56. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4921 (1945).
57. 56 Stat. 746 (1942), 49 U.S.C. § 319 (1958).
58. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Northern Pacific Terminal Co., 128 F. Supp. 475
(D.C. Ore. 1953).
59. Merchandise Warehouse Co. v. A.B.C. Freight Forwarding Corp., 165 F. Supp.
67 (S.D. Ind. 1958).
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section 502 of the Labor Management Relations Act,60 which provides that
"the quitting of labor by an employee or employees in good faith because of
abnormally dangerous conditions for work at the place of employment of
such employee or employees [shall not] be deemed a strike under this Act."
This could have no application to railroad employees, who are in no way
subject to the act. In the only reported effort to apply it to motor truck
drivers, in a picket line situation, the NLRB held that the existence of
"abnormally dangerous conditions" must be shown by objective evidence. 61
The second problem relates to maintenance or restoration of public
utilities during the course of a strike. The source of public utility regulation
is state rather than federal and the responsibility of the utility to maintain
service is not too clearly defined in the state laws.
In Pennsylvania the Public Utility Code 62 requires the utility to "furnish
and maintain . . . and . .. make all such repairs . . . as shall be necessary . . . for the accommodation, convenience and safety of its patrons ...

Such service also shall be reasonably continuous and without unreasonable
interruptions or delay." Moreover, section 1310 of the code states that the
utility shall be liable in damages for failure to supply services in accordance
with the act.6 3 Under section 413 of the code, the Public Utility Commission,
either on its own motion or on request of a party, may hold hearings and
6
issue orders to the utility.

4

Under the code a common carrier is declared to be a public utility. 65
The federal law common carrier concept of public duty to serve can presumably be applied in like manner to public utilities under state law. There is the
added factor in the case of utility service of "patron safety." However, there
has been no case on point under Pennsylvania law. The Pennsylvania Penal
Code separately provides criminal penalties for tampering with telephone
or electrical apparatus. 66
New York law supplies an illustration of the concept here involved. In
Schivera v. Long Island Lighting Co.,6 7 the lower court issued an injunction

directing a lighting company to furnish service to the plaintiff where the
facts showed that the plaintiff had purchased a new house in a development
which was being picketed by construction unions and the utility employees
had refused to cross the picket line. This ruling was not appealed.
60. 61 Stat. 162 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1956).
61. In Re Redwing Carriers, 130 N.L.R.B. 1208 (1961).
62. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1171 (1959).
63. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1500 (1959).
64. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1183 (1959).

65. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1102(17) (c) (1959).
66. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 4916, 4860 (1945).

67. 61 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sup. Ct. 1946), rev'd in part, 270 App. Div. 852, 60 N.Y.S.2d
793 (1946), aff'd, 296 N.Y. 26, 69 N.E.2d 233 (1946).
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The third problem has diminished in size since the 1959 amendments
to the NLRA. Historically the employer has been faced with the possibility
of a boycott or refusal to handle his struck goods by the employees of his
customers. Labor agreements which include such "hot cargo" clauses are
now declared illegal under the NLRA.68 Further, a refusal to handle such
goods is a form of strike which constitutes separately a union unfair labor
practice under section 8(b) (4) of the NLRA.6 9
The fourth problem relates to the duty of the employer to continue collective bargaining activity during the course of an economic strike. Upon
demand by the union there continues a duty on the part of the employer to
meet for purposes of collective bargaining. There are two exceptions to this
general principle. The first is where the employer is convinced that such
meetings would be futile under all the circumstances. The second exception
is where the employer has made a good faith determination that the union
has lost its right to represent the employees because the union's majority
has been dissipated. This applies only after the lapse of the certification year.
The law controlling the duty to bargain has, to a large extent, grown out
of Brooks v. NLRB. 7 D In that case the Board conducted an election which
was won by the union. One week later the employer received a letter, signed
by a majority of the employees, repudiating the union. On the basis of this
letter the employer refused to bargain, claiming that the union did not
represent a majority of the employees. The Board found that the employer
had thereby committed an unfair labor practice and ordered him to bargain
with the union; the court of appeals enforced the Board's order. The employer
appealed to the Supreme Court where the decision of the court of appeals was
affirmed.
The question on appeal was whether an employer had a duty to bargain
with the duly certified bargaining representative, if shortly after the election
which resulted in certification the union has lost, without fault of the employer, a majority of the employees from its membership. The Supreme
Court, after finding that the duty to bargain existed during the certification
year, then explained:
[W]hat we have said has special pertinence only to the period
during which a second election is impossible. .

.

. [T]he Board

has ruled that one year after certification the employer can ask for
an election or, if he has fair doubts about the union's continuing
majority, he may refuse to bargain further with it. [Citing Celanese
68. Brown v. Local 17, Amalgamated Lithographers, 180 F. Supp. 294 (N.D. Cal.

1960).
69. Ibid.
70. 348 U.S. 96 (1954).
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Corp. of America, 95 N.L.R.B. 664 (1951).] This . . . is a matter
71
appropriately determined by the Board's administrative authority.

This language indicates that under the facts in the Brooks case an employer
will not be relieved of his duty to bargain during the certification year even
though the union has lost its majority status without fault of the employer.
The Court did, however, apparently approve the Board's decision in the
Celanese case, 72 in which it was held that, subsequent to the lapse of the
certification year, an employer could refuse to bargain with a union which
he, in good faith, believed to have lost majority status.
Decisions subsequent to the Brooks case tend to bear this out. In NLRB
v. Minute Maid Corp.73 the facts showed that one year and a day subsequent
to certification, a majority of Minute Maid's employees filed a petition
repudiating the incumbent union and requesting its decertification. This
petition was dismissed because of a pending unfair labor practice charge
against the employer. Thereafter, the employer refused to bargain, claiming
that the union had lost its majority status. The Board found that the employer had committed the unfair labor practice (noted as "pending" above)
and also that it had unfairly withdrawn recognition from the union since the
loss of majority status could not affect the union's representative status in
light of the company's preceding unfair labor practice. The Board ordered
the company to bargain with the union.
The Fifth Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's order, finding
initially that the company had not been guilty of unfair practices prior to its
refusal to bargain with the union. As to the propriety of the company's
refusal to bargain, the court said:
But if the employer takes the position that the union has lost its
majority, and if it is determined that the position is correct and
that the loss of majority was not attributable to unfair labor practices of the employer, then justification for the refusal to bargain has
been established. . . . The union cannot avoid the consequences
of a loss of representation by7 4 the mere filing of an unfair practices
charge against the employer.
3
In NLRB v. Superior Fireproof Door & Sash Co., 7"
the court held
that under the Brooks decision an employer could refuse to bargain with the
incumbent union after the lapse of the certification year, without waiting for
the time-consuming decertification process:

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 104. (Footnotes omitted.)
Celanese Corp. of America, 95 N.L.R.B. 664 (1951).
283 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1960).
Id. at 710.
289 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1961).
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Such a view accords not only with the Supreme Court's statement
in Brooks but with the exigencies of business life. Decertification
is a time-consuming endeavor. .

.

. If an employer wishes full pro-

tection from claims of a union, he may find it "better practice" to
await decertification as the Board suggested in cases cited in the
Brooks opinion . . . but if he is willing to have less piotection,

perhaps in order to have more employees, he may lawfully make
that choice under the circumstances defined in Stoner [Stoner
Rubber Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 1440 (1959)] and Minute Maid. 76
In the Stoner case, 77 the Board extended the rule of Celanese7 8 by
holding that an employer may not only refuse to bargain with a union which
has lost its majority status, but may also unilaterally change the terms and
conditions of employment. As to the latter, however, the employer must be
subsequently proved correct in his belief that the union has lost its majority;
if he is incorrect an unfair labor practice will have been committed.
Two further cases illustrate that the problems may come up either
during or after the strike. In NLRB v. Bradley Washfountain Co. 79 the
union engaged in an economic strike and the employer replaced the strikers
with permanent employees. The strike collapsed and the members applied
for reinstatement. The new employees then filed a petition to decertify as a
result of which the employer refused to bargain further with the union. The
court found that the employer has an economic right to continue the operation of his plant, that economic strikers may be permanently replaced and, if
no positions are open, that the employer has no duty to rehire them. The
court reasoned that since the employees had petitioned for decertification it
became incumbent upon the union to petition the Board for a determination
of the question of representation. Emphasizing that under the Midwest
Piping doctrine 8 the Board would hold an employer to have committed an
unfair labor practice should he recognize a union where a question of representation has been raised, the court denied enforcement of the Board's order.
In Texas Foundries,Inc. v. NLRB 8' the employer permanently replaced
all the strikers and thereafter, the strike being still in progress, refused to
bargain with the union on the ground that it had lost its majority status. The
certification year had elapsed. The Board found that the employer had been
guilty of bad faith bargaining and ordered the strikers reinstated. The court
found to the contrary and held that in the absence of an unfair labor practice
the employer may permanently replace strikers. If as a result of this action
76. Id. at 719.
77. Stoner Rubber Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 1440 (1959).
78. Celanese Corp. of America, supra note 72.
79. 192 F.2d 144 (7th Cir. 1951).
80. Midwest Piping & Supply Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1945).
81. 211 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1954).
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the union loses its majority status, the employer is relieved of his duty to
bargain.
It seems clear that an employer who has permanently replaced economic
strikers, and who entertains a good faith, reasonable belief that the union has
lost its majority status, may refuse to bargain with the incumbent union as
long as the certification year has run and the employer has committed no
unfair labor practices.
It should be noted, however, that the result so easily reached in the
Texas Foundries case would appear to be subject to some uncertainty
82
today. At the time of that decision section 9(c) (3) of the Taft-Hartley Act
provided that "employees on strike who are not entitled 'to reinstatement
shall not be eligible to vote" in a representation election. Under this provision
the employer could accurately estimate whether or not the union had lost
strength to such an extent that it no longer could be said to represent a
majority of the employees. The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 amended section 9(c) to provide that:
Employees engaged in an economic strike who are not entitled to
reinstatement shall be eligible to vote under such regulations as the
Board shall find are consistent with the purposes and provisions of
.. . [the National Labor Relations Act, as amended] in any election conducted within twelve months after commencement of the
strike.83
The amendment gives economic strikers a qualified right to vote in elections
held during the first year of the strike. By negative implication, replaced
strikers have no right to vote in representation elections after the termination
of the first year of the strike.
One result of the new provision is to inject a new element for the consideration of an employer who is attempting to discern, during the first year
of the strike, whether or not the union is a majority representative of the
bargaining unit. He must now consider that replaced strikers would be
counted in considering the union's majority status.8 4 This would not be so
if the refusal to bargain occurs after the strike termination. 5 In either case
the number of replacements cannot exceed the number of strikers.86
As suggested above there are three ways in which the union's continued
right to bargain may be tested. The returning employees and/or the permanent replacements may file a decertification petition ;s7 the employer may file
82. 61 Stat. 144 (1947).
83. 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (3) (Supp. III, 1962).
84. Pacific Tile & Porcelain Co., 137 N.L.R.B. No. 169 (1962).
85. At strike termination the striker's dual status as "employee" ceases.
86. Greinspan Engraving Corp., 137 N.L.R.B. No. 135 (1962).

87. LMRA § 9(e), 61 Stat. 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(e) (1958).
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an employer's petition for election;S8 or the employer may test the status of
the union by refusing to bargain and then litigate the question in an unfair
labor practice proceeding.8 9 Since the refusal to bargain can convert an
economic strike into an unfair labor practice strike, management should
choose this course only upon solid evidence of change in employee wishes.
Management must be alert not to confuse a return to work with a
repudiation of right to represent. Frequently the individual worker, while
voicing objection to the present leadership or to their strike tactics, may
still support the incumbent union in the event of an election. Furthermore,
it must be recognized that there are tactical advantages to not challenging
the union. Management frequently can gain solid improvements in cooperation where the union has engaged in an unsuccessful strike and where the
union leadership realizes that its position is at best "shaky."
CONCLUSION OF THE STRIKE

The strike effort will eventually approach termination in one of several
ways, assuming that it does not during its course become an unfair labor
practice strike. These possible alternatives are:
(1)

A full abandonment of the strike and all associated picketing with
an unconditional offer to return made by the union.
(2) A conditional offer made by th6 union to return and to end the
strike where the sole condition is that all striking employees be
reinstated to their former positions.
(3) Negotiation and execution by the parties of a strike settlement
which in effect sets forth the terms and conditions for a new labor
contract.
(4) Repudiation of the union by its member employees with the strikers
seeking to return to work and to bargain on their own behalf.
As stated earlier, under the first situation the employer is under no
duty to re-employ the strikers except to the extent that he seeks to staff
positions for which no permanent replacement had been obtained prior to
the unconditional offer of return. In regard to placement of former strikers
in new or future positions, the employer's sole duty is to show no discrimination because of strike participation. There is no obligation to afford preferential treatment to former striking employees.9 0
Under the first or second condition, the union normally will not press
for continuation of collective bargaining since its position has been signifi88. LMRA § 9(c) (1) (B), 61 Stat. 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1) (B) (1958).
89. Stoner Rubber Co., supra note 77.
90. Economy Stores, Inc., supra note 52.
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cantly weakened. However, it may still seek to execute an agreement along
the lines of the company's last offer in order to have a "contract bar" against
"raiding" by outside unions.
Under the second condition described above, the offer amounts to an
"unconditional" one if no permanent replacements have been made or if no
discharges for picket-line misconduct have occurred. In absence of the
latter circumstances the offer is truly "conditional" and management is
under no obligation to yield to the demand for return of all to former positions. Any such "conditional" offer will often be converted into an "unconditional" offer by any display of hesitancy or unwillingness on management's
part.
The third type of termination is the one most frequently encountered
and is the one which usually permits each side to claim victory or at least
to save face. The problem of the integration of the striking employee and
the replacement employee must be solved. Additionally, before the strikers
return to their former positions the treatment of the time lost during the
strike for purposes of vacation, seniority, holiday pay, insurance and pension
calculations should be decided upon. 91
The fourth eventuality poses the most serious difficulty to management
in terms of ending the strike. If management attempts prematurely to deal
with any type of employee committee, other than the certified bargaining
agent, it runs the risk of an unfair labor practice charge.9 2 Because of this,
management is wise in requiring strict proof of leadership repudiation and
desire for new representation by a majority of the striking employees. In
dealing with such a group the company's offer in terms of wages and fringe
benefits should not vary from that which was last offered to the certified
union; otherwise an unfair labor practice may lie.93
CONCLUSION

The great majority of strikes arising in the course of collective bargaining result in a shutdown of company production operations. This is attributable to many and diverse reasons not the least of which is the often mutually
shared expectation that the work stoppage will be of relatively short duration
and that thereafter everyone will return to work under a new collective bargaining agreement with "bygones being bygones." In many cases the shutdown is due to the vastness of the enterprise involved, and to the nature of
the production processes and skills required and the recognition of the prac91.
92.

Otherwise they will become grievances and subjects for arbitration.
An LMRA § 8(a)(5) refusal to bargain. 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C.

§ 158(a) (5) (1958).

93. An LMRA § 8(a)(3) promise of benefit. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(3) (1958).
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tical impossibility of recruiting an adequate number of replacement employees.
Plant shutdowns may occasionally actually benefit managements which
are "top heavy" with inventory and "lean" on customer orders. But when
the collective bargaining environment has deteriorated to a point where
mutual confidence, respect and bargaining flexibility have disappeared, or
where the issues in dispute are regarded as basic and fundamental ones by
the parties or where intense competition exists in the industry, the decision
to operate during any strike becomes a possibility to be explored.

